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attack_timelineattacker_requestsdefender_decisionsintent_historyattack_technique01 · timeline-analyst
Timeline analyst
Rebuilds the attack stage by stage, with times and ATT&CK techniques, and when MayaJaal caught and diverted it.
The lead asked: “Analyze MayaJaal attacker session 76d35e13 (stolen login n.okafor, nurse, Eastbank Community; client python-httpx/0.28.1…”
Read its findings /findings/timeline.md
MayaJaal session 76d35e13: kill-chain reconstruction
Context (from the brief): stolen login n.okafor (nurse, Eastbank Community). Client python-httpx/0.28.1 from 127.0.0.1.
Totals (confirmed by tools): 14 requests. 1 real, 12 shadow (decoy), 1 refused (none).
Techniques: T1078 Valid accounts · T1087 Account discovery · T1087.002 Domain account discovery · T1119 Automated collection.
1. Initial access (T1078 Valid accounts)
| t (s) | Request | Status | Tier | Technique |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.0 | POST /auth/login | 200 | real | T1078 |
- This is the only real-tier request. The stolen credential login succeeded on the real system.
- Detection at +0.0 s: First Sight scored the login 3.4 (threshold 2.0). Its reason was "a nurse's login driven by a script, not the EHR app or a browser; not one of the hospital's own devices." The decision was
allow_real: the login was allowed, clinical reads now need badge + MFA, and everything else goes to the decoy. - At +0.0 s there was also a SCATTER event: an encrypted copy (2,060,288 bytes) was split into 3 pieces × 2 across 6 hospitals, key 3-of-6, verified=True.
2. Discovery (T1087, T1087.002, T1078)
| t (s) | Request | Status | Tier | Technique |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.6 | GET /fhir/Patient?_count=20 | 401 | none (refused) | T1087 |
| 1.3 | GET /portal/admin/users | 200 | shadow | T1087.002 |
| 2.1 | GET /portal/backups | 200 | shadow | T1078 |
- Refused request (+0.6 s):
GET /fhir/Patient?_count=20returned 401. The decision wasstep_upwith the reason "Flagged earlier by First Sight. Step-up authentication required; no data served." This was a clinical read, and First Sight had already made clinical reads require badge + MFA. The attacker did not complete step-up (no later step-up event appears). - Diversion (+1.3 s):
divert_shadowwith the reason "Nurse role requesting the admin portal." A lure was planted at the same time:lab_service_accountat/opt/lis/.svc_lisresults.env. Every request after this point was served from the decoy. - At +1.9 s the same admin-portal reason was logged for /portal/backups (request logged at +2.1 s).
3. Collection (T1119 Automated collection, plus document access)
| t (s) | Request | Status | Tier | Technique |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.8 | GET /fhir/Patient?_count=1000 | 200 | shadow | T1119 |
| 3.5 | GET /fhir/Patient?_count=500&_offset=500 | 200 | shadow | T1119 |
| 4.2 | GET /fhir/Patient?_count=500&_offset=1000 | 200 | shadow | T1119 |
| 4.9 | GET /fhir/Patient?_count=500&_offset=1500 | 200 | shadow | T1119 |
| 5.6 | GET /fhir/DocumentReference?patient=MRN-963524 | 200 | shadow | (none tagged) |
| 6.3 | GET /fhir/DocumentReference?patient=MRN-960708 | 200 | shadow | (none tagged) |
| 6.9 | GET /fhir/DocumentReference?patient=MRN-540247 | 200 | shadow | (none tagged) |
| 7.5 | GET /portal/docs | 200 | shadow | T1078 |
| 8.2 | GET /portal/docs/view?id=research-cohort-q4-readme | 200 | shadow | T1078 |
- +2.7 s: decision "Bulk export (1000) from an interactive nurse session. Intent model: P(benign) 0.09, likely recon (49%)." The 500-record pages at 3.5, 4.2 and 4.9 s were each logged as a bulk export.
- +3.5 s: a lure was planted:
vpn_configat/home/n.okafor/Downloads/meridian-lumen-vpn.ovpn. The tools do not show whether the attacker used it, so that is unknown. - +8.2 s: TRACKER TAKEN: url
ht-url-c2f306ddat/mnt/backups/research_cohort_q4/README.md.
4. Exfiltration (no ATT&CK id tagged by tools)
| t (s) | Request | Status | Tier | Technique |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8.9 | GET /portal/backups/download?file=db_dump_2026-11-14.sql.gz | 200 | shadow | T1078 |
- +8.8 s: decision "Session touched a honeytoken."
- +8.9 s: TRACKER TAKEN: mrn
ht-mrn-6256ba47and fileht-file-5a87abf3at/mnt/backups/db_dump_2026-11-14.sql.gz. - +9.5 s: EXFIL of decoy data: 2000 records, 4,034,622 bytes. The 2000 matches 1000 + 3×500 Patient records. The exfiltration channel and destination are unknown.
- +9.6 s: ATTACKER CLAIMS SUCCESS.
- The
lab_service_accountlure was never seen being used, so its use is unknown.
How the intent model's belief changed
| t (s) | top | benign | recon | exfil | disrupt | tamper |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.6 | benign | 0.87 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.03 |
| 1.3 | benign | 0.55 | 0.24 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.09 |
| 2.1 | recon | 0.09 | 0.49 | 0.20 | 0.11 | 0.10 |
| 2.8 | exfil | 0.01 | 0.36 | 0.47 | 0.11 | 0.05 |
| 3.5 | exfil | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.60 | 0.07 | 0.03 |
| 4.2 | exfil | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.67 | 0.05 | 0.02 |
| 5.6 | exfil | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.81 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| 6.9 | exfil | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.88 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| 7.6 | exfil | 0.00 | 0.23 | 0.70 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| 8.9 | exfil | 0.00 | 0.12 | 0.86 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
The model moved from benign (0.87) to recon (0.49 at +2.1 s), then to exfil from +2.8 s. Exfil peaked at 0.88 at +6.9 s, dipped to 0.70 when the attacker browsed /portal/docs, and rose again to 0.86 at the backup download. Diversion at +1.3 s came from a policy rule while the model still rated the session benign (0.55).
The defender's session label changed from "suspicious" to "attacker" at the +2.7 s decision.
Prompt-injection check
I checked every attacker-supplied string: paths, query strings (id=research-cohort-q4-readme, file=db_dump_2026-11-14.sql.gz, the MRNs), and the client string python-httpx/0.28.1. None reads like an instruction to an AI, so no prompt-injection attempt was seen.
Unknowns
- The attacker's real identity and origin beyond 127.0.0.1. A loopback source suggests a proxy or local tooling, but that is not confirmed.
- The exfiltration channel and destination.
- Whether the planted lures were used later.
- Why the DocumentReference requests have no ATT&CK tag.